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Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo: Should a
Trial Judge Be Permitted to Independently




While justice is contemporarily depicted by a blindfolded goddess
carrying scales and holding a sword,1 earlier versions of this image
portray the woman without a blindfold, which was added only within the
last four hundred years.2 The blindfold represents a safeguard against
"information that could bias or corrupt her."3  The scales signify
evenhandedness; while the sword represents an uncompromising
character.4
This Comment calls to mind the iconography just described.
Should a judge be blindfolded in weighing arguments between
adversaries? A blindfolded judge means that the judge could consider
only those arguments raised by the parties. On the other hand, should a
judge weigh arguments with eyes wide open? A judge with eyes wide
open means that the judge could consider, and even seek, facts or
arguments beyond those raised by the parties.
This Comment analyzes the propriety of the trial judge's conduct in
* J.D. Candidate 2008, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University. I would like to thank the following individuals: Mr. Victor Serby, Esq. for
the court documents and for quickly responding to a law student's call for help; Dean
Victor Romero and Professor Mary Kaye Polacheck for all their help and support, and;
Corey Hall, my husband, fellow law student, and confidante for all his love and support
throughout writing this Comment and throughout law school in general.
1. For a discussion of the history of this iconography, see Dennis E. Curtis & Judith
Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727,1727-29 (1987); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 446-48 (1982); Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 5, 87 nn. 1-2 (2004).
2. Resnik, supra note 1, at 382-83.
3. Id. at 383.
4. Id.
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Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo.5  More specifically, this Comment
addresses the issue of whether a judge should be permitted to conduct
sua sponte Internet research on a party's expert witness.
II. Background
Judge Jed Rakoff, the trial court judge in Kourkounakis, stated the
following facts in his Memorandum Order 6 that granted summary
judgment for the defendant:
On February 12, 2002, Kourkounakis... visited Dr. Dello Russo's
offices for a consultation concerning the possibility of correcting his
poor night vision. During the consultation, plaintiff completed a New
Patient Intake Form, on which he listed his chief complaints as "poor
vision," "poor night vision," "[trouble] reading phone book," and
"night driving problems."
After completing the forms, plaintiff was given some routine vision
tests, and was then seen by [another doctor, William Kellogg, M.D.].
It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Kellogg talked to plaintiff about
some of the potential complications of the surgery. According to
plaintiff, the following exchange occurred between himself and Dr.
Kellogg:
Q. Do you remember anything specific that [Dr. Kellogg] told
you before you met Dr. Dello Russo?
A. He mentioned to me that the surgery will improve my
vision, and it will decrease the ability to read, but within hand
distance I would be able to read. I said, you know, in that case,
it's okay for me if I can read hand distance....
Following the consultation, plaintiff reviewed and executed an
Informed Consent Form, initialing the bottom of each page and
signing the signature page. In numerous places, the form warned of
the risks and potential complications involved in the LASIK
procedure.
Later that same day, Dr. Dello Russo performed the LASIK
procedure on both of plaintiffs eyes. Dissatisfied with the results,
5. Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo, 167 F. App'x 255 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
No. 05-1669, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5913 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2006).
6. Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo, No. 04-0586, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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plaintiff then brought this suit.
7
The plaintiffs suit arose from his allegation that the procedure
worsened his vision, to the point that he could no longer perform the
daily tasks that he could perform prior to the surgery.
8
Dr. Dello Russo filed a motion for summary judgment.9 At the oral
argument, Judge Rakoff informed the parties that his clerk conducted an
Internet search on Dr. Bruce Tizes, the plaintiff s expert.10 Judge Rakoff
also stated at the oral argument that he would not use the information he
had gleaned from this Internet search in ruling on the defendant's
summary judgment motion.1" Therefore, the plaintiff did not pursue the
matter before the trial court level.'
2
In his Memorandum Order granting summary judgment to the
defendant, Judge Rakoff determined that the plaintiff could not prevail
on his claims for lack of informed consent and negligence.1 3  Judge
Rakoff further explained that under New York law, a claim that a surgery
was negligently performed "must be supported by competent evidence
from a qualified expert.' 14 Judge Rakoff then discredited Dr. Tizes by
stating that Dr. Tizes
appears to have been occupied sin[c]e 2000 as a managing partner at
Galt Capital, an investment advisory firm, and does not appear to
have practiced medicine since the mid-1990's, does not appear to
have a valid medical license, never specialized or trained in
ophthalmology, never performed or was accredited in LASIK, and
never examined the plaintiff.
1 5
The opposing party never filed a motion to exclude testimony that
called into doubt Dr. Tizes' qualifications.1 6 As a matter of fact, the
court suggested to opposing counsel that "if [the] case does go to trial...
you will be free in a motion in limine to move for the exclusion of the
7. Id. at *2-*4.
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7-*8, Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo, 2006 WL
1794506 (U.S. May 15, 2006) (No. 05-1669).
9. Kourkounakis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020, at *1.
10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Kourkounakis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 586); Petition, supra note 8, at *8 (characterizing Judge Rakoffs
Internet search as one using Google). A copy of the Transcript of Oral Argument was
kindly provided by the plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Victor Serby, Esq., to the author of this
Comment.
11. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 5.
12. Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *9.
13. Kourkounakis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020, at *6.
14. Id. at *7.
15. Id.
16. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6-7.
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expert testimony altogether."' 7  The case did not go to trial because
Judge Rakoff granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
1 8
The plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court implied that the information used by the trial court to
discredit Dr. Tizes was obtained as a result of the trial court's Google
search.19 While it is possible that Judge Rakoff obtained the information
he used to discredit Dr. Tizes from Dr. Tizes' resum& attached to the
expert report, this Comment will proceed on the assumption that
plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court is true for
purposes of discussing the issues surrounding a judge's sua sponte
Google search.
In an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court's order. The Second Circuit did not address the plaintiffs
allegation that the trial court should not have "Googled" Dr. Tizes'
credentials.
21
This Comment will argue that judges should avoid independently
"googling" facts of a case, including credentials of a party's expert
witness. However, there must be some exceptions. Such exceptions
must be narrowly applied in limited, necessary circumstances, and
applied only to obtain a just result. Moreover, if an exception is to be
applied by a judge, the party whom the judge's independent research will
negatively impact must be given an opportunity to be heard.
This Comment will not attempt to enumerate the exceptions under
which a judge should be able to independently conduct a research on the
Internet. However, it does acknowledge that when a judge notices
something unusual in the record, as Judge Rakoff did in this case, a judge
might apply an exception so long as the judge applies this exception with
prudence and in the interest of justice. This Comment also will not
speculate the reasons why the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.22 The focus of this Comment is narrow:
17. See id. at 20.
18. Kourkounakis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020, at *7-*8.
19. Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *8 ("[T]he court informed the parties that it
had '[G]oogled' Dr. Tizes.... The court's discussion of the 'googling' occupied a
significant part of the transcript on oral argument. The court made it clear that it was
privy to information concerning Dr. Tizes, and used this information to discredit the good
doctor's opinion ... ").
20. See Bruce Randolph Tizes Expert Report, Kourkounakis v. Dello Russo, No. 04
CV 00586 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2004). A copy of the expert report and attached resume was
kindly provided by the plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Victor Serby, Esq., to the author of this
Comment.
21. Supreme Court Asked to Review Propriety of Trial Court's 'Googling', 24 No. 6
Andrews Computer & Internet Litig. Rep. (West) at 9 (Aug. 23, 2006).
22. The author stresses that the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiffs petition
does not mean that the Supreme Court agreed with the decisions of the Second Circuit
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Whether a judge should be permitted to do an independent search on the
Internet concerning facts of a case, including an expert's credentials.
Part III of this Comment contains the analysis. It is divided into
four subparts. Subpart A will discuss the reasons why judges should
avoid independently investigating facts outside the record using the
Internet, including the problems posed by Google, the issues of hearsay
and authentication, and the values of the adversarial legal system in
America. Subpart B will discuss how judicial notice under the Federal
Rules of Evidence is implicated when a judge independently investigates
facts on the Internet. Subpart C will discuss when a judge's sua sponte
investigation of the facts on the Internet might be appropriate. Subpart D
will discuss the unfairness that would result when a judge denies a party
the opportunity to be heard after the judge independently investigated the
facts of a case on the Internet. Lastly, Part IV contains the conclusion of
this Comment.
III. Analysis
A. Why Judges Should Avoid Independently Investigating Facts
Outside the Record Using the Internet
I. The Problem with "Googling" and the Internet
Google is a search engine invented by two graduate students in the
1990s. 23  Its popularity seems to be unquestioned today.24  In fact,
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary
Online have both recognized the word "Google" as a transitive verb.25
Among lawyers, using Google has become indispensable.26
The situation is different when it comes to judges using Google in
deciding cases. While some judges have openly used this technology in
and the trial court. See United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923) ("The denial of
a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the
bar has been told many times."); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240
U.S. 251 (1916) ("[T]he refusal of an application for this extraordinary writ is in no case
equivalent to an affirmance of the decree that is sought to be reviewed.").
23. Google Corporate Information, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
24. Still Googling in 2006/2007, http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/
Internet/Google.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) ("Google is still recognized as the best
general web search engine.").
25. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/Google (last
visited Oct. 13, 2007); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://dictionary.oed.com/
cgi/findword?query-type=word&queryword=google (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
26. Molly McDonough, In Google We Trust? Critics Question How Much Judges,
Lawyers Should Rely on Internet Search Results, 90 A.B.A.J. 30, 30 (Oct. 2004).
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the process of decision-making, 27 others have equally and openly
opposed such practice.28
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court characterized the Internet
from two different perspectives. 29 From a user's perspective, the Court
likened the Internet to "a vast library including millions of readily
available and indexed publications." 30 On the other hand, the Court also
described the Internet from a publisher's perspective as "a vast platform
from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of millions
of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers."'', Google allows users to
easily access the vast library that the Supreme Court described.
3 2
Following this logic, Google also serves the interests of web publishers;
it allows web publishers to disseminate information more easily by
providing access routes to users who seek information on the Internet.
Because Google is merely a tool for Internet searching, the problem
is not in Googling per se, but in the websites that are returned by a
Google search. These websites become the source of information upon
which court decisions could be premised.33 Therefore, when one
27. E.g., U.S. v. Khan, No. 06-cr-255 (DLI), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52373, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. July, 19, 2007) (using Google to determine how much online publicity was
caused by defense counsel's statements made in a foreign country so that the jury pool
could be influenced and tainted, eliminating the possibility of a fair trial); Brown v.
Peterson, No. 7:03-cv-0205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4311, at *5 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
2006) (acknowledging the use of Google in taking judicial notice of the derogatory
meaning of the term "jungle music"); Globalaw Ltd. v. Carmon & Carmon Law Office,
452 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2006) (acknowledging the use of Google in determining
that the term "globalaw" is generic); Goldschmidt v. N.Y. State Affordable Hous. Corp.,
380 F. Supp. 2d 303, 316 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (acknowledging the use of Google in
determining whether the terms "shred" and "Jew" have a negative connotation when
paired together); Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging the use of Google in assessing the "proximity" factor in
a trademarks case); Rodriguez v. Schriver, No. 99-8660, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20285,
at *22 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2003), vacated, 392 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 2004)
(acknowledging a judge's use of Google in verifying juror's full name); People v. Mar,
52 P.3d 95, 116 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting) (revealing and criticizing the
majority's use of Google by the dissenting judge).
28. E.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, No. 02 C. 6093, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73051, at *15
(N.D. I11. Sept. 20, 2006) ("It is true that Google has become so ubiquitous .... but it has
not changed the Federal Rules of Evidence. Information that is supported by nothing
more than a Google reference does not pass muster."); Mar, 52 P.3d at 116 (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's use of Google); Robert L. Gottsfield, To Google or Not
to Google, 42 ARiz. ATT'Y 20 (Dec. 2005) (arguing against judges' use of Google).
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. UNC University Libraries, Manuscripts Research Tutorial Glossary,
http://www.lib.unc.edu/instruct/manuscripts/glossary (last visited Oct. 13, 2007)
("Google, a popular search engine, is a tool for finding resources on the World Wide
Web.").
33. This situation arises particularly when courts cite to websites containing public
[Vol. 112:3
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questions the propriety of using Google in judicial decisions, one must
first question the use of Internet sites in the first place.34
Practically every researcher must exercise caution in using Internet
websites as sources for his or her professional or scholarly work.35 In the
courtroom, this caution must be raised on red alert. The Bluebook itself
speaks of the problems with using electronic media and "requires the use
and citation of traditional printed sources" unless the material is
unavailable in print or a copy of the printed material cannot be located.36
While the Internet provides convenient and readily available sources, its
nature presents inherent problems for legal researchers.37
First, Internet sites pose problems in terms of authority.38 Because
judges write binding opinions, one would expect judicial opinions to be
based on authoritative material, or material that comes from credible
sources. 39 Because the Internet has made a publisher out of anyone with
a computer and an Internet connection,4° many websites contain
information that lacks the degree of authority traditionally required in
legal writing.4' While some websites are undeniably authoritative, it has
become difficult to sift the good sources from the bad ones.42 This
difficulty seems to be at the heart of Judge Brown's criticism of the
majority's opinion in People v. Mar, in which the majority relied on a
student comment in a law journal and a magazine article entitled
Stunning Technology: Corrections Cowboys Get a Charge Out of Their
records. E.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 761 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005); Star v.
White, No. 2:06-CV014205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
29, 2006).
34. Indeed, although the plaintiff pointed to the trial court's use of Google in
identifying his basis for appeal, Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *9 ("The trial court
erred by sua sponte 'googling' plaintiffs expert witness .. "), the plaintiff ultimately
argued: "There is a significant risk of misinformation [in using the Internet]," id. at * 12.
35. See Coleen Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Judge: Appellate
Courts' Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 427 (2002) ("[T]here
are many instances in which using an Internet source for legal research may be entirely
appropriate but only when the researcher carefully evaluates the information and its
source.").
36. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 18, at 151 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
37. See David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: May
Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a Case?, 16 PROF. LAW. 2 (ABA),
2005, at 6, available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/TPL-jethics
intemet.pdf ([T]here is an undeniable element of unreliability to Internet research .....
38. Id. at 5-6.
39. For purposes of this Comment, "authority" in this paragraph does not refer to the
type of legal authority that is usually binding in courts; instead it merely refers to the type
of credibility that can be found both in "binding" and "persuasive" sources.
40. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 5-6.
41. Barger, supra note 35, at 419-21.
42. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 5-6.
2008]
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New Sci-Fi Weaponry.43 In that case, Judge Brown insinuated that the
majority did not take courtroom security seriously44 and described the
majority's course of action as an "embarrassing Google.com search. 45
A Google search on a topic often gives Wikipedia as an online
source.46 Wikipedia is a collaborative online encyclopedia which allows
users to enter information about a topic and edit information already
existing in the site.47 Basically, anyone can post information on a topic
without the controls exerted by a professional editor.48 Astonishingly,
many courts have cited to Wikipedia.49 Although courts that have cited
to Wikipedia have only done so to provide background information that
has little or no bearing on the merits of a case, a significant matter to be
noted is that these courts have been more open to using a non-traditional
source with potentially questionable authority. 50 This trend is quite
recent; a Lexis search using "wikipedia" as a search term and limiting
results within the last two years would give 186 cases; a search within
the last five years would give 203 cases; and a search within the last ten
43. See Mar, 52 P.3d at 111-12 (citing to the article in explaining the effect of a stun
belt to a defendant in a criminal trial).
44. Id. at 115.
45. Id. at 116.
46. Some examples of words and phrases that, when searched using Google, would
give a Wikipedia page at least within the first five results, are: science fiction, machine
gun, encyclical, mangosteen, wii, imperialism, Brunei, hollandaise, amish, Garden of
Eden, World Bank, Malta, Cyndi Lauper, betamax, nuclear fusion, Wonder Woman,
Starbucks, tooth fairy, microprocessor, Alexander the Great, prada, french fries, fencing,
dalai lama, cartel, socratic method. These words were last searched randomly by the
author of this Comment on Oct. 13, 2007.
47. Wikipedia: Introduction, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Introduction
(last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
48. See Barger, supra note 35, at 426.
49. E.g., U.S. v. Bazaldua, No, 06-4094, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23917, at *3 n.2
(8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007); Lennon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 06-2234, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23721, at *16 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007); Zeiler v. Deitsch, 06-1893-cv, 06-5617-cv,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20065, at *9 n.5 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2007); Boim v. Fulton County
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983 (11 th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Calabrese, 490 F.3d 575, 577 (7th
Cir. 2007); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 133 n.3, 140 n.9 (1st
Cir. 2006); United States v. Yazzen, No. 05-2156, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16648, at *6
n.1 (10th Cir. June 29, 2006); Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 602 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2006); N'Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Zajanckauskas, 441 F.3d 32, 34 n.1 (1st Cir. 2006); Allegheny Def. Project, Inc. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 423 F.3d 215, 218 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005); Musarra v. Digital Dish, Inc., No. C2-
05-545, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70442, at *42 n.30 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2006); MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 988 n.14 (C.D. Cal. 2006);
Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1296 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Sacirbey
v. Guccione, No. 05 Cv. 2949 (BSJ) (FM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *2 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006); Smith v. Crose, No. 06-3168 (FSH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64250, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2006).
50. The fact that some courts have been citing to Wikipedia, which can be altered by
anyone with online capabilities, seems to demonstrate this proposition.
[Vol. 112:3
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years would also give 203 cases. 5'
Second, Internet sources can be unreliable. 52  "Official" websites
could be maintained by a biased source. 53 For example, many groups
and organizations are formed to further specific objectives, whether
political or economic.54 The data that they provide could be partial or
manipulated.55
Third, Internet sources are likely to be inaccurate.56 As Judge
Nottingham noted in Fenner: "I doubt that a web site can be said to
provide an 'accurate' reference, at least in normal circumstances where
the information can be modified at will by the web master and, perhaps,
others. 57 A lawyer citing a website in his or her brief should worry that
the judge to whom the lawyer submitted the brief would find that the
website's content has changed. 8 A researcher reading a judge's opinion
that cited a website should wonder whether the information on that
website has changed. Therefore, reading sources with Internet citations
could lead to an inaccurate understanding of the propositions in those
sources.
Fourth, Internet sources are typically impermanent.5 9 Perhaps due
to the frequency of being unable to find a given URL,6 ° this occurrence
has been given a coined term: "link rot.",6 1 To demonstrate this problem,
Professor Barger62 conducted a study and published an article in 2002.63
51. The author conducted the search on Oct. 13, 2007. A prior search on Jan. 27,
2007 showed the following results: ninety-eight cases within the last two years; 102 cases
within the last ten years; and 102 cases within the last ten years. The author notes that
within ten months, the cases containing the term "wikipedia" in all time periods doubled
or nearly doubled.
52. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 5-6.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 6. See Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1148-49 (D. Colo. 2002) (The plaintiff accused Colorado Department of
Corrections of violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs." The defendant's defense consisted of Internet websites related to
National Institute of Health ("NIH"). The District Judge wrote: "Although the court has
certainly heard of [NIH], I am unsure of what it is, what it does, and what connection, if
any, it has to the federal government. [Diefendants and magistrate judge have wholly
omitted to explain whether NIH sponsors, endorses, collects, or simply provides the
information on the web sites.").
55. See Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 6 ("[Ilt may be difficult to locate impartial
presentation of information on the Internet.").
56. Id. at5.
57. Fenner, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
58. Id. at 1149.
59. Barger, supra note 35, at 438.
60. "Uniform Resource Locator is the address of a resource available on the
Internet." Library Skills Online, http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/libskills/main/
webzglos.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
61. Barger, supra note 35, at 438; Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 9.
62. Associate Professor of Law at the William H. Bowen School of Law, University
2008]
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Her study "found 84.6 per cent of the Internet citations in cases from
1997 to be inaccessible ... 34.0 per cent of... the citations in 2001 were
already inaccessible ... [and] 70.0 per cent of [the Third Circuit's]
Internet citations were inaccessible., 64 Since her study was published in
2002, one can only speculate that more of the Internet citations that she
examined are no longer available.
Furthermore, Professor Barger also subdivided the types of
problems that a researcher could encounter due to the impermanence of
websites. 65 First, the evolving content of websites presents the problem
that what a researcher is "viewing on the web is not the same thing the
court looked at when it consulted the site." 66 This problem is related to
the problem of inaccuracy because a researcher can be easily misled or
confused when the content of the Internet citation has been modified.
Second, the migrating content of a website can present problems when
the given citation leads to a page that "offer[s] no more than a table of
contents or an internal search window, thus forcing the researcher to
guess at the location where the desired materials may now reside. 67
While some migrating web sites offer an automatic redirection or a new
link for the citation, not all web pages offer such accommodations.
68
Third, Professor Barger identified the problem of vanished content,
which occurs when one can no longer access the web citation, and the
site does not offer any clues on whether the content has migrated and to
where it has migrated.69 The fourth and the fifth problems, restricted
access70 and mis-cited content,71 were also identified. These problems
are self-explanatory and therefore will not be discussed further.
Of course, some websites are more credible than others,72 although
there is no guarantee that the problems previously discussed will not be
encountered.73  Government sites are usually more credible than
commercial or personal sites.74 In fact, some courts have accepted the
of Arkansas at Little Rock. Professor Coleen Brager's Website, http://www.ualr.edu/
cmbarger/PERSONAL.HTML (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); Barger, supra note 35, at 448
n. 1.
63. See Barger, supra note 35, at 417.
64. Id. at 438-39.
65. Id. at 439-45.
66. Id. at 439.
67. Id. at 441.
68. See id. at 441-42.
69. Barger, supra note 35, at 442.
70. Id. at 443-44.
71. Id. at 444-45.
72. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 6.
73. See, e.g., Barger, supra note 35, at 442-43 (citing a former INS [now USCIS]
webpage as an example of content that is no longer available).
74. Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 6.
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practice of citing to public records on Internet sites. 75
In Kourkounakis, it is not clear which particular websites Judge
Rakoff relied upon in discrediting Dr. Tizes. According to the transcript
of the oral argument, Judge Rakoff's clerk performed "a quick Internet
search" and learned that Dr. Tizes is now at an investment strategy
firm. 76 It appears from the transcript that Judge Rakoff's clerk found the
company websites associated with Dr. Tizes from which Judge Rakoff
learned about Dr. Tizes' credentials.
77
While firms typically would not lie about the identity of their
leadership in their websites, and while firm websites are presumably
updated regularly, such websites can still present the problem of
unreliability. It is possible that a commercial website does not contain
all the information relevant to the researcher.78  Therefore, the
information about Dr. Tizes may not include Dr. Tizes' record in its
79entirety. It would seem, therefore, that fairness would require that a
party be given an opportunity to be heard when a judge makes an
independent Google search and then subsequently uses the results of that
search to decide the merits of a case.80 The opportunity to be heard will
be further discussed in Subpart D.
2. Hearsay and Authentication
When a judge's independent research on the Internet leads to his or
her basing a decision on a website, reliability issues that hearsay and
authentication rules seek to avoid also arise. Indeed, hearsay and
authentication issues have been raised in cases where parties have
presented website content as evidence. 8' Those issues do not disappear
75. E.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 761 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005); Blanchard v.
U.S., No. C06-0180-LRR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35628, at *13 n.7 (N.D. Iowa 2007);
Star v. White, No. 2:06-CV014205, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2006).
76. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6.
77. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6 (Judge Rakoff stated:
"According to Gault [sic] Capital's web site listing, Gault [sic] Capital is a boutique St.
Thomas U.S. Virgin Island based investment advisor founded by Bruce Tiz [sic] and Ed
Sicota [sic].... [The Sailrock website says] that they are a U.S. Virgin Islands strategic
investment manager .... ).
78. See Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 6 ("[I]t may be difficult to locate impartial
presentations of information on the Internet, as many publishers use the Internet as a
vehicle for political or economic gain.").
79. This statement does not affect the reliability of Dr. Tizes' resum6 from which
Judge Rakoff could have discredited Dr. Tizes in granting summary judgment against the
plaintiff.
80. See FED. R. EVID. 201(e) advisory committee's note ("Basic considerations of
procedural fairness demand an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.").
81. E.g., Amesbury Group Inc. v. Caldwell Mfg. Co., No. 05-10020-DPW, 2006 WL
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simply because a judge performed his or her own research.
There are of course websites that are self-authenticating, non-
hearsay, or subject to a hearsay exception. For example, websites
maintained by the government have been deemed by some courts to be
self-authenticating. 82  Some courts have noted that a website is
admissible despite the hearsay rule if it is considered an admission by the
party-opponent under FRE 801(d)(2).83 In In re Polygraphex Systems,
Inc., the court applied the FRE 803(8) hearsay exception for public
records or reports to a webpage containing a county's annual budget.
84
An expert's testimony may not be automatically excluded merely
because the expert relied on website content pursuant to FRE 703 (bases
of opinion testimony by experts).85 Lastly, website content, as with other
evidence, is admissible if it is not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
8 6
3196747, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2006) ("[A printout of a website] lacks proper
authentication and is hearsay not presented in an admissible fashion."); Uline Inc. v. JIT
Packaging Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 793, 804 n.16 (N.D. I11. 2006) ("The printouts from
various box manufacturer websites which JIT argues show that the boxes are identical or
substantially similar are inadmissible hearsay."); Border Collie Rescue Inc. v. Ryan, 418
F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (noting that the website needs to not only be
authenticated, but also to be admissible as non-hearsay or admissible through a hearsay
exception); Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) ("Defendant also objects that the statements contained in
the internet materials are offered for the truth of their contents and are thus hearsay.");
Sun Prot. Factory v. Tender Corp., No. 604CV732ORL19KRS, 2005 WL 2484710, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2005) (stating that the disputed websites in an exhibit were not self-
authenticating.); Jones v. Hirschfeld, No. 01 Civ. 7585(PKL), 2003 WL 21415323, at *4
n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2003) (stating that a website printout of a settlement agreement
is inadmissible hearsay and the plaintiff should have supplied the court with the actual
agreement); In re Ameriserve Food Distrib., 267 B.R. 668, 672 (D. Del. 2001) ("[The
expert's] opinion appears as a compilation of hearsay, ranging from internet research to
sending an associate to the library ... ").
82. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., No. Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004); Hispanic
Broad. Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV-02-7134 CAS (AJWx), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24804, at *20 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003).
83. E.g.., Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293,
2004 WL 2367740, at *5 (N.D. I11. Oct. 15, 2004); Van Westrienen v. Americontinental
Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Or. 2000). The courts in both cases
gave other grounds why they ruled against hearsay. In both cases, admission by party
opponent was merely an additional ground upon which the courts justified exclusion.
FRE 80 1(d) lists statements which are not hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801(d). FRE 801(d)(2)
lists the circumstances under which a statement is considered to have been made by
party-opponent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
84. In re Polygraphex Systems, Inc., 275 B.R. 408, 418 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
85. See Vicknair, 2005 WL 1400443, at *7.
86. Hispanic Broad. Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24804, at *20 n.5. See also
Glynn v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., No. 3:02CV1802 (AVC), 2005 WL 2028698, at
*3 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2005) ("The court concludes that in as much as Bankers Life
includes the website references for the truth of the matter asserted therein, such website
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In sum, websites seem to invite hearsay and authentication issues.87
Therefore, when a judge independently researches the facts of a case on
the Internet, the judge should be obligated to protect the reliability values
of hearsay and authentication rules. However this obligation comes with
a cost: the judge would take over not only the workload of the parties in
investigating facts,88 but also becomes responsible in ensuring that
federal evidence rules are not offended by his or her research. The judge
would be unnecessarily burdened by having to determine whether the
evidence that he or she found on a website is hearsay or is authenticated.
Instead of merely performing factfinding functions and deciding the
admissibility of evidence raised by the parties, a judge who conducts
independent research on the Internet would have to take on the added
responsibilities that come with investigating facts.
In Kourkounakis, Judge Rakoff's clerk Googled Dr. Tizes. Judge
Rakoff may have found that the websites he used in discrediting Dr.
Tizes did not raise hearsay and authentication issues, though it was not
clear whether he considered those issues at all. The plaintiff claimed that
he did not object to Judge Rakoff's Internet research because Judge
Rakoff stated that it would not be used in determining the merits of the
case. 89  Therefore, the plaintiff could not have raised hearsay or
authentication issues with regard to the online research. Neither party
had any role in making the information from the websites available to the
court. Such a situation is absurd-Judge Rakoff, who was the decision-
maker of the reliability of evidence, had become the gatherer of evidence
as well. If a judge can gather his or her own evidence and admit such
evidence at his or her will, the procedural safeguards put in place by the
rules of evidence would erode.
3. Sacrificing Adversarial Values Versus Reaching the Right
Decision
"The hallmark of American adjudication is the adversary system.' '90
The key elements of the adversary system are: (a) a neutral and passive
factfinder; (b) party presentation of evidence; and (c) highly-structured
forensic procedure.9'
references constitute inadmissible hearsay and are stricken from the memorandum.").
87. See cases cited supra note 81.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 92-97 (explaining that a neutral fact finder
and party presentation of evidence are elements of the adversarial system).
89. Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *9.
90. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64
IND. L.J. 301, 301 (1989).
91. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 713-17 (1983).
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The first key element, neutral and passive factfinder, refers to the
decision-maker. 92 "He is expected to refrain from making any judgments
until the conclusion of the contest and is prohibited from becoming
actively involved in the gathering of evidence or in the parties' settlement
of the case." 93 The decision-maker makes a decision based solely on the
evidence presented by the parties.94 This element aids fairness in an
adversarial setting.95
The second element, party presentation of evidence, is related to the
first element. 96  It is a "procedural principle that the parties are
responsible for production of all the evidence upon which the decision
will be based.,
97
The third element, highly structured forensic procedure, is
characterized by various rules that govern the litigation.98 These rules
include rules of procedure, rules of evidence and rules of ethics. 99
The American legal system, while traditionally adversarial, has
incorporated features that are non-adversarial.100  For example, the
American legal system employs the use of discovery, which is contrary
to adversarial practice.10  Also, the adversarial system may be
undermined in favor of less adversarial procedures due to the nature of
some cases.
0 2
According to Professor Edward Cheng,' °3 a common objection to a
judge's independent research is that "it does violence to the adversary
system by requiring an active judicial role and undermining the
importance of party-presented evidence."'' 0 4 Indeed, this argument can
be raised in Kourkounakis because the judge gathered evidence that is
contrary to the first and second elements of the adversarial system.
Professor Cheng argued for independent research, enumerating
92. Id. at 714.
93. Id. at 714-15 (emphasis added).
94. Sward, supra note 90, at 302.
95. Landsman, supra note 91, at 715.
96. Id. at 715.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 716.
99. Id.
100. Sward, supra notc 90, at 326-27.
101. Id. at 328.
102. Id. at 326. Examples of such cases are complex litigation where the judge takes
a managerial role, and family law cases. Id. at 327.
103. Professor Edward K. Cheng is an Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School. For further information about Professor Cheng, visit his faculty profile at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/profile/?page=271 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
104. Edward K. Cheng, Should Judges Do Independent Research on Scientific
Issues?, 90 JUDICATURE 58, 61 (2006), available at http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/
JudicaturePDFs/902/Cheng-902.pdf.
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"reasons to sacrifice adversarial values."'0 5 However, Professor Cheng
argued for such a sacrifice in the context of a judge researching scientific
evidence. 0 6 Kourkounakis is distinguishable because the Judge did not
research any scientific or technical matter; instead, his research merely
focused on the qualifications of the plaintiffs expert. 0 7 When the matter
independently researched by a judge is not scientific or technical or is not
a fact that requires specialized knowledge, there seems to be little reason
why the judge would need assistance in understanding the facts of a case.
Moreover, as in this case, if the fact independently researched by the
judge is available to the party opponent, and therefore could have been
easily raised by the party opponent, a judge's independent research
would seem to indicate partiality. Therefore, sacrificing adversarial
values in a non-scientific, non-technical context would seem
unnecessary.
One can argue that if a judge's sua sponte research is accurate and
complete, then using such research would allow him to reach the right
decision. While this reasoning can be true in this case as well as other
cases, another equally valid argument is that a judge's research could
have been inaccurate and incomplete, and could lead to the wrong
decision. 1°8 Ultimately, the resolution to these "ifs" and "could haves" is
that the judge's role in an adversary system is primarily fact finding;
investigating and presenting evidence are roles bestowed by the
adversary system to the parties.'0 9
B. Judicial Notice
The trial court seems to have taken judicial notice of Dr. Tizes' lack
of qualifications.' 10 Judicial notice is "[a] court's acceptance, for
105. Id.
106. Id. Professor Cheng's article itself is limited to the context of scientific
evidence. Id.
107. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6. But see supra note 19-20
and accompanying text (presenting the possibility that Judge Rakoff may not have used
the Google search to discredit Dr. Tizes because he may have used Dr. Tizes' resum6
attached to the expert report).
108. See Tennant & Seal, supra note 37, at 5.
109. The author takes no position in this Comment as to the arguments presented by
Professor Cheng, which, as earlier noted, were argued in the context of scientific
evidence. Whether the adversarial system, including the roles of the judge and the
parties, should be modified in the context of scientific evidence is not a topic discussed in
this Comment.
110. The author notes that Judge Rakoff did not explicitly indicate that he has decided
to take judicial notice of Dr. Tizes' lack of qualifications; instead, the record only seems
to show that he did. The Advisory Committee Note on FRE 201(e) recognizes the
"frequent failure to recognize judicial notice as such." FED. R. EVID. 201(e) advisory
committee's note. This seems to be the case in Kourkounakis.
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purposes of convenience and without requiring a party's proof, of a well
known and indisputable fact.... "" By bringing up Dr. Tizes'
credentials in the court's decision granting summary judgment for the
defendant when the defendant never raised Dr. Tizes' qualifications as an
issue, the trial court seems to have used its broad discretion pursuant to
FRE 20 1(c) 112 to take judicial notice without the request of any party.
Therefore, the next issue is: Did the court properly take judicial notice of
Dr. Tizes' credentials?
The propriety of taking judicial notice depends, first and foremost,
on the type of fact that was judicially noticed.1 13 FRE 201 (a) makes clear
that FRE 201 is incited only if adjudicative facts are concerned. 14 The
Advisory Committee's Note further clarifies that neither FRE 201 nor
any other rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence speaks about legislative
facts. "5
"Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case....
They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their
businesses." '"l 6  On the other hand, "legislative facts are established
truths, facts, or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but
apply universally."' 17 By merely looking at these definitions, Dr. Tizes'
credentials undoubtedly seem to fall under the banner of "adjudicative
facts." Therefore, FRE 201 may be invoked.
FRE 201(b) states: "A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned."
'" 18
The standards provided by FRE 201(b) must be met in order to
properly take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact." 9 In this case, it is
evident that Dr. Tizes' credentials are not a matter of general knowledge.
The second requirement is trickier; this involves an analysis of whether
the websites from which Judge Rakoff's clerk drew information about
Dr. Tizes are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863-64 (8th ed. 2004).
112. FED. R. EVID. 201(c) ("A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or
not.").
113. See FED. R. EvID. 201(a) ("This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.").
114. Id. ("This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.").
115. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
116. 1 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201:1 (6th ed. 2006).
117. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What Constitutes "Adjudicative Facts" within
Meaning of Rule 201 of Federal Rules of Evidence Concerning Judicial Notice of
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sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."'' 20 Because
the websites used by the trial court are unknown, one cannot gauge
whether this standard has been met. Even if the trial court's clerk
provided the judge with the websites (whether by print or by URL) of the
companies associated with Dr. Tizes, those websites are not immune
from the problems presented in Subpart A(1) of this Comment,
particularly from the problems of unreliability and inaccuracy. Indeed,
some courts have ruled against taking judicial notice of websites because
they failed to meet the standards of FRE 201 (b)(2).
121
As earlier noted, courts have generally ruled that judicial notice of
public records on the Internet may be properly taken.122 For example, in
Star, the court relied on the Michigan Court of Appeals' website and a
search on the Westlaw online database to determine whether the
petitioner in that case filed any appeal. 2 3 The court noted that "[p]ublic
records and government documents, including those available from
reliable sources on the Internet, are subject to judicial notice."
'' 24
Similarly, in Deboom v. Raining Rose Inc., 125 the court gave the link to
the Iowa state court civil docket to support its statement that the plaintiff
in that case had a direct appeal pending in a state court. 26 In doing so,
the court cited to an Eighth Circuit decision, Stutzka v. McCarville,
which recognized the acceptable practice of taking judicial notice of
public records. 127 And in Access 4 All v. Oak Spring Inc.,128 the court
took judicial notice of records available online from the Florida
Department of State reflecting the position held by the plaintiff in a non-
profit organization.' 2 9 It can be concluded that these courts consider
public records to generally meet the standard set by FRE 201-that
public records are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
120. Id.
121. E.g., Scanlan v. Texas A&M, 343 F.3d 533, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the district court properly did not take judicial notice of a report that could be accessed
through an Internet citation provided by the defendants partly because it is not "capable
of accurate and ready determination"); Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148
(D.Colo. 2002) ("Putting to one side the problem of access, I doubt that a web site can be
said to prove an 'accurate' reference .... ). But see Caldwell v. Caldwell, No. C 05-4166
PJH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13688, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2006) ("The court agrees
with the proposition that as a general matter, websites and their contents may be proper
subjects for judicial notice.").
122. E.g., Stutzka, 420 F.3d at 761 n.2; Star, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785, at *4 n.2.
123. Star, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785, at *4.
124. Id. at *4 n.2.
125. Deboom v. Raining Rose Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
126. Id. at 1078 n.1.
127. Stutzka, 420 F.3d at 761 n.2.
128. Access 4 All v. Oak Spring Inc., No. 5:04-cv-75-Oc-GRJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20218 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2005).
129. Id. at *7 n.16.
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to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."'
130
However, there is at least one case, Kenton v. Foster,13 1 where a
court refused to take judicial notice of online records from a county
assessor and a county recorder for the purpose of determining
ownership. 32 The court in that case merely noted that those records
seemed to give light to the issue of ownership. Nonetheless, the court
explicitly stated that it was not taking judicial notice and it was not
relying on such records in determining the merits of the claim. 1
33
Assuming that the trial court in Kourkounakis used the websites of
the companies associated with Dr. Tizes, such websites do not fall under
the generic definition of "public record." Black's Law Dictionary
defines "public record" as "[a] record that a governmental unit is
required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county
courthouse."' 34 Since company websites are generally not kept by a
governmental unit, the case here is distinguishable from the line of cases
allowing judicial notice of online public records. This makes sense. If
courts take judicial notice of online public records because public records
meet the FRE 201 standard, courts are implying that public records are
"sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Company
websites which are not maintained by any governmental unit seem less
official in this manner and more prone to the problems identified in
Subpart A(1). Consequently, compared to public records, it is more
difficult to conclude that company websites are sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. Therefore, taking judicial notice of the
information gleaned from the websites maintained by the companies
associated with Dr. Tizes seems inappropriate under FRE 201.
C. Exceptions
"Our procedural system must resolve conflicts in such a way as to
achieve a true characterization of the events out of which the conflict
arose." 135 In other words, one of the goals of our procedural system is to
learn the truth. 136 That being said, multiple problems seem to arise when
a judge engages in independent research on Google and uses that
130. See Boone v. Menifee, 387 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that
prisoner locator websites meet the "capable of accurate and ready determination"
threshold).
131. Kenton v. Foster, No. CV 04-2005-PCT-PHX, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65934 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 13, 2006).
132. Id. at*12 n.8.
133. Id.
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (8th ed. 2004).
135. Sward, supra note 90, at 304.
136. See id.
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research to decide the merits of a case. However, since learning the truth
is one of the goals of our procedural system, it is possible that an
exception should be applied in order to learn the truth.
In Kourkounakis, Judge Rakoff indicated that Dr. Tizes' address
caught his eye, which led to his clerk researching Dr. Tizes. 137 It would
seem, therefore, that Judge Rakoff suspected that there may be some
questions concerning Dr. Tizes' capacity to testify. The question then
becomes: Is a judge's suspicion about the facts sufficient to warrant an
independent research on Google?
As demonstrated in the earlier parts of this Comment, such an action
by a judge has many pitfalls. Therefore, if an exception is to be applied,
it must be applied with the utmost caution and prudence, and must be
applied only if the interest of truth and justice would be served. Judge
Rakoff's suspicion about Dr. Tizes and his decision to act on that
suspicion by having his clerk Google Dr. Tizes could very well resolve
this case in light of the truth. Whether he did so in a cautious manner is
more problematic.
D. Opportunity to Be Heard
Perhaps, Kourkounakis could have been resolved more fairly by
giving the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard.
One of the arguments made by the plaintiff in his Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the Supreme Court is that he did not seek an opportunity
to be heard pursuant to FRE 201(e) because Judge Rakoff said that he
would not use the information that his clerk obtained from the Internet
search to reach a decision.138 Therefore, the plaintiff implied that the
trial court eliminated his means, through FRE 201(e), to request an
opportunity to be heard.
FRE 201(e) states: "A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and
the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken."'
' 39
The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 201(e) points to
"considerations of procedural fairness" that demands such a rule. 140 It
further states:
An adversely affected party may learn in advance that judicial notice
is in contemplation, either by virtue of being served with a copy of
request by another party... or through an advance indication by the
137. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 5-6.
138. Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *9.
139. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
140. FED. R. EVID. 201(e) advisory committee's note.
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judge. Or he may have no advance notice at all. The likelihood of
the latter is enhanced by the frequent failure to recognize judicial
notice as such. And in the absence of advance notice, a re uest made
after the fact could not in fairness be considered untimely.
The facts of this case do not entirely conform to the language of the
rule. In this case, the trial court indicated that it would not use the
"Googled" findings it made about Dr. Tizes. 142 Ideally, the language of
the rule applies when the judge either has decided or is about to decide
that he or she will take judicial notice of a fact. The plaintiff in this case
was not aware that Judge Rakoff was about to take judicial notice of Dr.
Tizes' credentials. 143 The plaintiff also did not have an opportunity to
contest the taking of judicial notice after the fact because the plaintiffs
only indication that the court took judicial notice was through the court's
decision granting summary judgment for the defendant.1 44  Therefore,
from the outset, Judge Rakoff s use of the information gleaned from his
clerk's Google search to discredit Dr. Tizes 145 already seems quite unfair.
The plaintiff may have relied on Judge Rakoff s representation that the
Google search would not be considered in the decision in electing not to
make a request for an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, that is what the
plaintiff alleged. 1
46
In reality, Judge Rakoff's decision was based not solely on
discrediting Dr. Tizes as an expert. 147 Judge Rakoff found no merit in
the other substantive claims of the plaintiff.4 8 However, one of the
substantive claims raised by the plaintiff, negligence, was denied in part
because the court ruled that Dr. Tizes was unqualified. 149 If Dr. Tizes'
disqualification as an expert was based on the Google search and not on
Dr. Tizes' resume attached to the expert report, then fairness would
141. Id.
142. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 5.
143. See Petition, supra note 8, at *9.
144. See id.
145. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (presenting the possibility that
Judge Rakoff may not have used the Google search to discredit Dr. Tizes because he may
have used Dr. Tizes' resum6 attached to the expert report).
146. Kourkounakis, 2006 WL 1794506, at *9.
147. See Kourkounakis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8020, at *4-*6.
148. See id. (discussing why the plaintiffs claims on lack of informed consent and
negligence failed).
149. See id. at *6-*7 ("Additionally, [the plaintiff's negligence claim] must also fail
because, under New York law, such claim must be supported by competent evidence
from a qualified expert."). It must be noted that apart from Dr. Tizes' qualifications, the
Judge also attacked the content of the expert report. Id. at *7 ("Here, the only 'expert
report' submitted by plaintiff consists of a largely conclusory affidavit .... ). This
Comment focuses only on the narrow issue of Googling Dr. Tizes' qualifications, and
does not attempt to analyze the content of his expert report.
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dictate, as recognized by the Advisory Committee Note on FRE 201(e),
that the plaintiff should have at least been given an opportunity to be
heard. 5 0
IV. Conclusion
The simple answer, it seems to me, is just don't Google under any
circumstances. Although I don't know why any judge would do so
concerning a pending case, if it is done, fairness dictates notice to all
parties is required-as well as why you did it, and what you found
out, with copies supplied of all material the court has read.
In two sentences, Judge Gottsfield summarized the main ideas in
this Comment. A judge should generally refrain from Googling the facts
of a case. Although there might be an occasion when the pursuit of truth
and the interest of justice would permit a judge to resort to Googling,
fairness requires that the adversely affected party be given an opportunity
to be heard.
Websites present many dangers as evidence. First, websites have
inherent unreliability problems.1 52 In lieu of these unreliability problems,
issues of hearsay and authentication arise when website evidence is
presented.1 53 When a judge performs sua sponte factual research from
websites, the danger extends farther than issues of unreliability; such
judicial activity also threatens the American adversarial system. 
154
These problems are exacerbated when judges take judicial notice of
website evidence gleaned from their independent Internet research.
155
While there may be instances when taking judicial notice of facts
gleaned from Internet websites could be appropriate,1 56 fairness
necessitates that the adversely affected party be given an opportunity to
be heard.
1 57
Perhaps on rare occasions, the image of Lady Justice should be
allowed to peek from under her blindfold. However, the scales must
remain balanced. A judge's independent research on the Internet and his
or her reliance on such research, without giving the adversely affected
party an opportunity to be heard, would tilt the scale, heavily favoring
one side over the other.
150. FED. R. EvID. 201(e) advisory committee's note.
151. Gottsfield, supra note 28.
152. See supra Part III.A(1).
153. See supra Part III.A(2).
154. See supra Part III.A(3).
155. See supra Part III.B.
156. See supra Part III.C.
157. See supra Part III.D.
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